What Is the Moral Sense Theory? Hutcheson, Hume & Smith

Direct Answer

The moral sense theory is the view that moral goodness and evil are perceived through sentiment or a distinct moral faculty, rather than discovered by reason. According to the theory, when we observe a generous act we do not infer that it is virtuous through argument; we feel approval, in something like the way we feel the warmth of the sun. This feeling — the "moral sense" or "moral sentiment" — is the source of moral distinctions. The theory was pioneered by the Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) and developed systematically by Francis Hutcheson, then carried to its most famous formulations by David Hume and Adam Smith. For Hutcheson, the moral sense is a distinct faculty, analogous to the external senses, that naturally approves of benevolence and disapproves of cruelty. For Hume, moral distinctions are "not derived from reason" but from sentiment: virtue is whatever produces the pleasing sentiment of approbation in the spectator. For Smith, moral judgment is the work of the "impartial spectator" — the imagined disinterested observer whose sympathy with the parties determines our approval or disapproval. The theory grounds morality in human nature rather than in the rational structure of the world.

Historical Context

The moral sense theory arose in reaction to two rival accounts of morality. Against the rationalists, who held that moral truths are discovered by reason like mathematical truths, the sentimentalists argued that reason alone is inert: reason can tell us how to achieve our ends, but it cannot tell us which ends are good. Against the egoists and Hobbesians, who held that morality is a human invention for mutual benefit, the sentimentalists argued that moral approval is natural, immediate, and disinterested: we approve of kindness even when it does not benefit us. The theory flourished in the Scottish Enlightenment, where Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith made sentiment the foundation of ethics and of the emerging social sciences. Its influence then diverged. Kant rejected it, insisting that morality must be grounded in reason if it is to be necessary and universal. The utilitarians transformed the moral sense into the principle of utility. And in the twentieth century, the emotivists revived the sentimentalist core — moral judgments express feelings — while abandoning the claim that there is a literal "sense" that perceives moral qualities.

Key Arguments & Debates

The sentimentalist argument begins from the phenomenology of moral experience. When we witness cruelty, the disapproval is immediate and visceral; it does not feel like the conclusion of an inference. Hume sharpened this into an argument: since reason concerns matters of fact and relations of ideas, and moral judgments are neither, they must proceed from sentiment. He also argued that moral distinctions could not be objects of reason because reason is universal while moral sensibility varies with the constitution of the perceiver. The theory faces several objections. Rationalists argue that moral judgments are objective and universal in a way that feelings are not: if "murder is wrong" were merely the expression of a feeling, it could not bind us independently of our sentiments. The theory also struggles with moral disagreement and relativism: if moral judgment is a matter of sentiment, and sentiments differ across cultures, then morality threatens to become relative. And the theory must explain the role of reason in moral life: Hume himself conceded that reason is needed to inform the passions and to generalize from particular cases. Smith's impartial spectator is the most sophisticated attempt to build objectivity into the sentimentalist framework: the spectator's standpoint filters out bias and partiality, yielding judgments that approach impartiality.

Contemporary Relevance

The moral sense theory lives on in contemporary moral psychology and in philosophical sentimentalism. Research in moral psychology confirms that emotions play a central role in moral judgment — that reactions like disgust and empathy drive many of our moral convictions — vindicating the sentimentalists' basic insight. Philosophers such as Michael Slote and Jesse Prinz have revived sentimentalism as a contemporary theory of moral judgment. And Adam Smith's impartial spectator remains a powerful tool in ethics and economics for modeling impartial moral reasoning. The theory also informs debates about whether moral judgments are objective: if morality is grounded in sentiment, the objectivity of moral truth is threatened, and the theory points toward relativism or non-cognitivism.

Related Concepts

The moral sense theory is the ancestor of emotivism and the sentimentalist strand of non-cognitivism. It is closely connected to moral motivation, since grounding moral judgment in sentiment explains its motivational force. Hume and Adam Smith are its leading figures, and its questions belong to metaethics.

Further Learning

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on moral sentimentalism surveys the tradition rigorously. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on Francis Hutcheson covers the founder of the theory. Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) and Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III (1739-40), are the primary texts.