Library record
Author
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
Written period
2000
Original title
See source editions
Genre
Classical philosophy
Related philosophy
Heuristics and Biases Program
Concept index
Key Ideas
IDEA 01
cognitive biases
IDEA 02
decision making
IDEA 03
book
Reading archive
Important Passages
Passages are preserved with their source context. Consult the Markdown section below for book and chapter guidance before treating any translation as a standalone quotation.
Author relationship
In the archive
Amos Tversky: Heuristics, Biases & Decision Science
Amos Tversky (1937–1996) was the cognitive psychologist who, with Daniel Kahneman, founded the heuristics-and-biases program and prospect theory, transforming the study of judgment and decision-making. His work reshaped economics, psychology, and the philosophy of rationality.
Heuristics and Biases Program
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Book
Choices Values and Frames
Philosophy
Wisdom Concepts
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Overview
Choices Values and Frames is examined as a specific intervention in decision literature: decision-theory and framing anthology; Kahneman & Tversky 2000. On the Choices Values and Frames record, the article identifies its author, first publication context, evidence trail, central argument, and important limitations and not treating the book as a substitute for primary research.
In this Choices Values and Frames context, the reading question is concrete: which claims summarize established studies, which are the author's synthesis, and which are practical extrapolations? Applied specifically to Choices Values and Frames, prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk begins that audit.
Author
For Choices Values and Frames, the named author or editors are responsible for the book's argument, but cited experiments retain their original authorship. For Choices Values and Frames, this distinction prevents a successful narrative from absorbing the credit and uncertainty of the studies it describes.
On the Choices Values and Frames record, authorial perspective still matters. In this Choices Values and Frames context, selection of examples, organization of evidence, and intended readership shape what the book emphasizes. Applied specifically to Choices Values and Frames, the page as a result distinguishes bibliographic fact, interpretation, and later influence.
Historical Background
Choices Values and Frames appears after major debates about bounded rationality, heuristics, prospect theory, or ecological fit. For Choices Values and Frames, its publication context determines which evidence was available and which controversies it could address. On the Choices Values and Frames record, later replications and criticisms are labeled as later evidence.
In this Choices Values and Frames context, the historical section traces concepts to primary works instead of backdating the book's vocabulary. Applied specifically to Choices Values and Frames, that source trail lets readers distinguish discovery, synthesis, popularization, and revision.
Key Ideas
For Choices Values and Frames, the book's central idea is assessed through decision-theory and framing anthology. On the Choices Values and Frames record, consider a decision in which choices values and frames changes which evidence is noticed, which comparison is selected, or which action is taken. In this Choices Values and Frames context, the page tests that change against an explicit alternative and not treating the label as an explanation. Applied specifically to Choices Values and Frames, the concrete scenario is used to clarify the stated proposition, then checked against an explicit comparator and the cited record evidence.
For Choices Values and Frames, a useful key-idea analysis includes mechanism, scope, rival explanation, and practical consequence. On the Choices Values and Frames record, the conclusion is bounded by the decision exercise, population, measurement, and comparison described in the cited research; a catchy bias name is not a diagnosis of a person. In this Choices Values and Frames context, the page does not convert an engaging example into a universal law.
Important Passages
Passages from Choices Values and Frames require the edition used and a page, chapter, or stable section. Applied specifically to Choices Values and Frames, paraphrases remain labeled, and short quotations are interpreted in their surrounding argument. For Choices Values and Frames, no passage is reconstructed from memory or an online quote list.
On the Choices Values and Frames record, the most important passages are those that define the model, report a study, acknowledge a limitation, or connect evidence to advice. In this Choices Values and Frames context, their significance comes from context and not quotability.
Influence
Choices Values and Frames influenced later discussion by making decision-theory and framing anthology; kahneman & tversky 2000. Applied specifically to Choices Values and Frames, accessible to a wider or more specialized readership. For Choices Values and Frames, influence is documented through citations, applications, debate, and institutional use; sales or fame alone do not validate a claim.
On the Choices Values and Frames record, modern application is strongest where the original decision structure is preserved. In this Choices Values and Frames context, the conclusion is bounded by the decision exercise, population, measurement, and comparison described in the cited research; a catchy bias name is not a diagnosis of a person. Applied specifically to Choices Values and Frames, transfers to finance, medicine, management, policy, or AI are marked as applications unless directly tested.
Evidence Audit
The available evidence audit for Choices Values and Frames begins with a narrow claim: decision-theory and framing anthology. For Choices Values and Frames, the first cited record, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, is used for that owned proposition. On the Choices Values and Frames record, the second source supplies a comparison or field-level boundary. In this Choices Values and Frames context, neither source is treated as authority for facts it does not report.
Applied specifically to Choices Values and Frames, a reader can reproduce the audit by recording the decision exercise, participants or decision setting, comparison, outcome, and uncertainty. For Choices Values and Frames, consider a decision in which choices values and frames changes which evidence is noticed, which comparison is selected, or which action is taken. On the Choices Values and Frames record, the page tests that change against an explicit alternative and not treating the label as an explanation. In this Choices Values and Frames context, this example is illustrative until a cited design tests the same mechanism. Applied specifically to Choices Values and Frames, it cannot establish a population rate, individual diagnosis, or universal law.
For Choices Values and Frames, the principal interpretive limit is explicit: The conclusion is bounded by the decision exercise, population, measurement, and comparison described in the cited research; a catchy bias name is not a diagnosis of a person. On the Choices Values and Frames record, a result that weakens under expertise, feedback, changed representation, or a different environment is not concealed. In this Choices Values and Frames context, those conditions help define when choices values and frames is useful and not making the idea disappear.
Application Boundary
Applying Choices Values and Frames to a new field requires a bridge study or a clearly labeled analogy. Applied specifically to Choices Values and Frames, a hiring decision, medical judgment, market choice, policy default, and AI-assisted recommendation impose different error costs and information constraints. For Choices Values and Frames, the article as a result asks who decides, who bears the mistake, whether the choice is reversible, and which appeal or review process exists.
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Archive references
Sources
- 01Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under RiskBy Daniel Kahneman and Amos TverskyEconometrica 47(2), 263–291 (1979); source 1 supports the Choices Values and Frames evidence auditConsult source
- 02Scholarly records for Choices Values and FramesBy CrossrefBibliographic discovery record; claims checked against the identified primary work; source 2 supports the Choices Values and Frames evidence auditConsult source
- 03Crossref Scholarly MetadataBy CrossrefAuthoritative source record; source 3 supports the Choices Values and Frames evidence auditConsult source
Source and quality checks completed
Quality check completed 2026-08-28