G. E. M. Anscombe on Intention

Quote

"Intentions are not private, inner acts of the will, which we then translate into deeds; they are expressed in what a person does and in what he says he is doing, and the agent knows what he is doing without observation."

— G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (1957); the final clause summarizes her account of "knowledge without observation" in Section 28

Historical Context

Elizabeth Anscombe published Intention in 1957, and it is now regarded as one of the most important works of twentieth-century philosophy of action. The book was written in the shadow of Wittgenstein, under whom Anscombe had studied, and it exemplifies his method of dissolving philosophical puzzles by attending to the ordinary uses of language. At the time, the philosophy of action was dominated by a picture of the mind inherited from Descartes and elaborated by empiricists: intentions were thought of as inner mental states — acts of willing — that stand behind overt behavior as causes stand behind effects. Against this picture, Anscombe argued that intention is not an inner episode to which we have privileged access but a concept we use to describe and explain what agents do.

The book also matters for ethics. In her famous essay "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958), published the year after Intention, Anscombe argued that the moral vocabulary of "obligation" and "duty" had become incoherent after the abandonment of the divine law framework in which it had made sense, and she called for a return to the psychology of the virtues — a call that helped launch the revival of virtue ethics. Intention supplies the psychology that essay demanded. Its account of intention as expressed in action rather than hidden behind it, and of practical knowledge as knowledge of what one is doing, remains the foundation of contemporary philosophy of action and a major influence on the understanding of moral responsibility.

Philosophical Interpretation

The quoted passage summarizes three connected claims. The first is negative: intentions are not private, inner acts of the will. Anscombe's target is the picture of the mind as an inner arena in which volitions occur and then somehow produce movements. She argues that we never observe a separate "act of willing" in ourselves, and that positing one explains nothing — it merely duplicates the problem by relocating it inside. The second claim is positive: intention is expressed in what a person does and in what he says he is doing. To ask "What is he doing?" and to receive the answer "He is writing a letter" is to receive a description of his intention, provided the description answers the question "Why?" — the question Anscombe takes to be the key to intention. An action is intentional under a description when the agent can answer "why?" in a way that reveals the reason for acting.

The third claim is the most famous: the agent knows what he is doing without observation. When I raise my arm, I do not need to watch it rise, nor to introspect a mental event, in order to know that I am raising it. This knowledge is not theoretical — it does not rest on evidence — but practical: it is the knowledge of the agent who is the source of the action. Anscombe called this "knowledge without observation," and she connected it to Aristotle's idea that practical knowledge is knowledge of what is being done, not of what merely happens. The thesis has far-reaching consequences. It explains why an agent's testimony about her own intention has a special authority, why weakness of will is puzzling, and why moral responsibility attaches to what we do — because what we do, under its intentional description, is precisely what we know ourselves to be doing.

Related Concepts

The passage is the centerpiece of the philosophy of action and of Anscombe's account of intention. It introduces the idea of practical knowledge and knowledge without observation, in contrast to theoretical knowledge based on evidence. It rejects the Cartesian model of the inner act of willing. The account connects to practical reasoning — reasoning that concludes in action rather than belief — and to moral responsibility, since an agent is answerable for what she intentionally does. The work also stands behind the modern revival of virtue ethics, which Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy" inaugurated.

Learning Path

Begin with the site's answer on what moral responsibility is, to see why intention matters for accountability. Then read the site's answer on what ethics is to place Anscombe's project in context. Explore the distinction between action and mere behavior, and the relation between intention and practical reasoning. Follow the modern development of the philosophy of action — in the work of Donald Davidson and later philosophers — and examine how the idea that we know our own actions without observation bears on debates about free will, self-knowledge, and the limits of introspection.