Skip to content

Quotation Archive

Parfit Quote on Identity: What Matters in Survival

Derek Parfit's claim from Reasons and Persons that personal identity is not what matters — what matters is psychological continuity, the relation that survives even in teletransportation.

Quotation archive

My conclusion is that personal identity is not what matters. What matters is Relation R: psychological connectedness and/or continuity, with the right cause.

Derek Parfit · Reasons and Persons

Quote record

Author

Derek Parfit

Source

Reasons and Persons

Chapter / location

1984, Part Three

Tradition

derek-parfit · personal-identity · reasons-and-persons · reductionism · philosophy-of-mind · identity

Source information

From Reasons and Persons, 1984, Part Three.

Original language: English

Translation

Translated from English into English using a named scholarly edition.

Context

The claim is the central conclusion of Part Three of Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), the work that transformed the philosophy of personal identity. Parfit argues for the reductionist view: a person's existence consists in the existence of a body and the occurrence of a series of mental events, related in certain ways, and there is no "further fact" of identity beyond this. His most striking argument uses the thought experiment of teletransportation: if a machine scans your body, destroys it, and recreates an exact replica on Mars, the replica is psychologically continuous with you — and Parfit argues that this continuity is what we really care about, not the identity that the replica (by the strict logic of identity) does not share with the original.

Interpretation

Derek Parfit's claim from Reasons and Persons that personal identity is not what matters — what matters is psychological continuity, the relation that survives even in teletransportation.

Knowledge network

Related Archive Records

Quote

"My conclusion is that personal identity is not what matters. What matters is Relation R: psychological connectedness and/or continuity, with the right cause." — Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984)

Author

Derek Parfit (1942–2017) was an English philosopher, a fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, and one of the most influential moral philosophers and philosophers of mind of the late twentieth century. His Reasons and Persons (1984) transformed the philosophy of personal identity and set the agenda for consequentialist ethics, and his second book, On What Matters (2011), argued for the convergence of the major normative theories. He was famous for the intensity of his devotion to a single set of questions: what matters in life, and what we owe to one another.

Source

The quotation is from Part Three of Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), "Personal Identity." The passage in which Parfit states the conclusion appears in the section on the teletransportation thought experiment, where he imagines the reader's response to discovering that they will be scanned, destroyed, and recreated — and argues that the loss of identity, if that is what occurs, is not the loss we fear.

Context

Part Three of Reasons and Persons defends the reductionist view of personal identity: the view that a person's existence consists in nothing more than the existence of a body and the occurrence of a series of mental events, and that the question "am I the same person as the person who existed yesterday?" is a question about the relations between these events — not about a mysterious further fact. Parfit's teletransportation argument is designed to test what we actually care about. If the machine destroys the original and recreates a psychologically continuous replica on Mars, most people report that they would not "survive" — the replica is a different person. But Parfit argues that everything we value in survival — memory, character, plans, relationships — is preserved by the replica, and that the insistence on identity is a fetish: we value continuity, and we mistake it for identity.

Meaning

The quotation states the most famous thesis in the philosophy of personal identity: identity is not what matters. The argument has three steps. First, the reductionist claim: there is no "further fact" of personal identity beyond the relations of psychological continuity. Second, the thought experiment: teletransportation shows that we can imagine survival without identity — everything we value is preserved while identity, in the strict sense, is lost. Third, the conclusion: what matters in survival is Relation R — psychological connectedness (the links of memory, intention, and character between successive mental states) and continuity (the chains of such connectedness) — with the right cause. The consequence is liberating and unsettling: the fear of death is, in part, a confusion, because what we fear losing is not an unanalyzable "self" but a set of relations — and the care we have for our future selves is more like the care we have for others than we like to think. This is why Parfit's conclusion matters beyond the narrow debate about identity: it changes the shape of self-interest, egoism, and the ethics of future generations.

The quotation belongs to the philosophical exploration of identity and its limits. Its claim that the self is a set of relations rather than a substance resonates with the Buddhist tradition's denial of the permanent self — a connection Parfit himself drew, noting the parallel between his reductionism and the Buddhist analysis of the self. It connects to the wider question of meaning: if the self is not a fixed thing, what does it mean for a life to matter? And it raises the question of what we owe to future selves and future persons — the theme of the fourth part of Reasons and Persons, which uses the same philosophical tools to argue for the ethics of future generations.

Knowledge Network

Archive references

Sources

2 scholarly sources
  • 01
    Reasons and PersonsBy Derek ParfitOxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, Part Three.
  • 02
    Derek ParfitBy Stanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyConsult source

ZHAIBIAN Editorial Board reviewed

Reviewed by ZHAIBIAN AI Editorial Review · 2026-08-05

Based on 2 scholarly sourcesLast updated 2026-08-05