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Russell Quote on Appearance: Reality as a Question of Degree

Bertrand Russell's observation that what counts as real turns out to be a matter of degree, not an all-or-nothing question, from The Problems of Philosophy.

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The question what is to be taken as real turns out to be a question of degree.

Bertrand Russell · The Problems of Philosophy

Quote record

Author

Bertrand Russell

Source

The Problems of Philosophy

Chapter / location

Chapter 2, 1912

Tradition

russell · appearance · reality · perception · epistemology · analytic-philosophy

Source information

From The Problems of Philosophy, Chapter 2, 1912.

Original language: English

Translation

Translated from English into English using a named scholarly edition.

Context

Read the contextual commentary in this archive entry.

Interpretation

Bertrand Russell's observation that what counts as real turns out to be a matter of degree, not an all-or-nothing question, from The Problems of Philosophy.

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Related Archive Records

Quote

"The question what is to be taken as real turns out to be a question of degree."

— Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Chapter 2, 1912)

Context

This passage appears in Chapter 2 of The Problems of Philosophy (1912), titled "The Existence of Matter." In this chapter, Russell grapples with one of the oldest problems in philosophy: how can we be sure that the physical world exists, given that our only access to it is through our senses, which we know can be unreliable?

Russell begins by noting that a table looks different depending on the angle, lighting, and distance from which we view it. To a painter, the table is a patchwork of colors. To a physicist, it is a collection of electromagnetic waves and atomic structures. To a person sitting at it, it is a solid, brown, rectangular object. Which of these is "the real table"?

Russell argues that all of these appearances are genuine — they are what the table really looks like from different perspectives. But this raises a puzzle: if the table appears differently from different viewpoints, and if we can never get "behind" our perceptions to compare them with the thing itself, how do we know there is a table at all, rather than just a collection of sense-data?

His answer is both nuanced and provocative. We cannot prove with certainty that matter exists, but we can show that it is the simplest and most natural explanation for the regularities in our experience. The existence of a physical table explains why our perceptions change in predictable ways as we move around it, why other people report similar experiences, and why tactile and visual data cohere. This doesn't give us certainty, but it gives us reasonable belief — and that, Russell suggests, is the most we can hope for.

Meaning

Russell is making a striking claim about the nature of reality itself: that "real" is not an all-or-nothing category. Things can be more or less real depending on how stable, how public, and how independent they are of any particular observer's perspective.

Consider a dream. Within the dream, the things you experience feel completely real. But when you wake up, you recognize them as mere appearances — mental constructions with no independent existence. The dream is "less real" than the waking world because it is private, unstable, and dependent on your mind alone.

Russell suggests that the same kind of grading applies even within our waking experience. A rainbow is real in one sense — many people can see it, and it appears at predictable times under predictable conditions — but it is less real than a rock, which you can touch, pick up, and which persists regardless of lighting or perspective. The table's "real" color, "real" shape, and "real" size are not identical with any single appearance but are constructed from the pattern of appearances.

This means that reality is not a binary (real vs. illusion) but a spectrum. Some things are more real than others, and the question "Is this real?" should often be replaced with "How real is this?" — meaning, how stable, how public, how independent of any particular viewpoint is it?

Philosophical Significance

Russell's observation has had wide-ranging influence:

Pragmatism and fallibilism: The idea that reality comes in degrees resonates with pragmatist philosophy, which treats beliefs as more or less warranted rather than simply true or false. It also supports fallibilism — the view that all our knowledge is provisional and subject to revision, since we can never achieve absolute certainty about what is "really" real.

Phenomenology: Russell's analysis of sense-data and appearance anticipated themes in phenomenology, particularly in the work of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who explored how consciousness constitutes reality through layered processes of perception and interpretation.

Philosophy of science: In science, the question of what is "real" is also a matter of degree. Is an electron real? In one sense, yes — it produces predictable, measurable effects. In another sense, it's a theoretical construct that has changed dramatically over the history of physics. Russell's framework allows us to say that electrons are real but in a different, more abstract way than tables and chairs.

Contemporary metaphysics: Modern metaphysicians continue to debate whether reality comes in degrees. "Degrees of being" theories, which have roots in Plato's hierarchy of forms and in medieval philosophy, have been revived by some contemporary thinkers who argue that different kinds of entities have different modes and levels of existence.

Sources

  1. Russell, B. (1912). The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford University Press. Available at: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5827/5827-h/5827-h.htm
  2. "Bertrand Russell," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/russell/
  3. "Russell's Theory of Knowledge," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/russell-epistemology/
  4. "Sense-Data," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at: https://iep.utm.edu/sensedat/
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Archive references

Sources

3 scholarly sources
  • 01
    Bertrand RussellBy Stanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyConsult source
  • 02
    The Problems of Philosophy (1912)By Bertrand Russell, Oxford University PressConsult source
  • 03
    Russell's Theory of KnowledgeBy Stanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyConsult source

ZHAIBIAN Editorial Board reviewed

Reviewed by ZHAIBIAN AI Editorial Review · 2026-08-14

Based on 3 scholarly sourcesLast updated 2026-08-14