How to Think About Political Obligation: A Philosophical Guide

Introduction

Why should we obey the law? This is one of the oldest and most fundamental questions in political philosophy. Plato's Crito depicts Socrates arguing that he has an obligation to obey the laws of Athens even when they condemn him to death. Thomas Hobbes argued that the alternative to political authority is a state of nature — a war of all against all. John Locke grounded political obligation in the consent of the governed. But the question remains: what gives the state the moral authority to demand our obedience, and what are the limits of that authority?

This guide provides a framework for thinking about political obligation. It surveys the major theories, examines their strengths and weaknesses, and offers practical guidance for navigating the tension between the claims of the state and the claims of conscience.

Step-by-Step Guidance

Step 1: Understand What Political Obligation Is

Political obligation is the moral duty to obey the laws of one's state or political community. It is distinct from:

• Legal obligation: the legal duty to obey the law, which is simply the requirement imposed by law itself.
• Moral obligation in general: the broader duties we have to others, which may or may not include obedience to the state.
• Mere compliance: following the law out of fear of punishment or self-interest, rather than from a sense of moral duty.

The question of political obligation is whether citizens have a genuine moral reason to obey the law — a reason that goes beyond fear of punishment or calculation of advantage.

Step 2: Examine the Major Theories

Consent Theory: The most intuitive theory: we have obligated ourselves to obey the law through our consent. John Locke argued that by consenting to membership in political society, we take on the obligation to obey its laws. The problem is that most people have never explicitly consented. Locke appealed to "tacit consent" — by enjoying the benefits of political society, including the use of its roads and the protection of its laws, we implicitly consent. But critics argue that tacit consent is not genuine consent when the alternatives are extremely costly or unavailable.

Fairness Theory: H. L. A. Hart and John Rawls argued that political obligation is grounded in fairness. When a cooperative scheme produces benefits that are available to all, those who benefit have an obligation to do their fair share in maintaining the scheme. If the state provides public goods — security, infrastructure, a legal system — that we accept and benefit from, we have an obligation to contribute our share, including obeying the law. The challenge is that we may not have chosen to accept these benefits; they are simply imposed on us.

Natural Duty Theory: Rawls also argued that we have a natural duty to support just institutions. This duty is not based on consent or reciprocity but on the inherent moral value of justice. We have a duty to comply with just institutions and to help establish them where they do not exist. This theory avoids the problems of consent and acceptance, but it raises the question of what counts as a sufficiently just institution.

Gratitude Theory: We owe obedience to the state out of gratitude for the benefits we receive. The state provides us with security, education, infrastructure, and countless other benefits. In return, we should obey its laws. The problem is that gratitude is typically a response to voluntary gifts, and the state's benefits are not voluntarily given but coercively imposed.

Association Theory: Ronald Dworkin argued that political obligation is like the obligations we have to family or friends. It arises from membership in a community, not from consent or contract. If we are members of a political community, we have associative obligations — the obligations that come with the role of citizen. The challenge is to explain why mere membership generates genuine moral obligations.

Step 3: Consider the Challenge of Philosophical Anarchism

Philosophical anarchists — Robert Paul Wolff, A. John Simmons, and others — argue that there is no general obligation to obey the law. The state claims authority over its subjects, but this claim cannot be justified. We may have moral reasons to obey particular laws (because they are just, because disobedience would harm others), but we do not have a general obligation to obey simply because the law commands.

This does not mean that philosophical anarchists advocate lawbreaking. They simply deny that the state has the moral authority to demand obedience. The practical implications are nuanced: we may often have good reasons to obey the law, but those reasons are not grounded in the state's authority.

Step 4: Apply the Framework to Practical Questions

When is disobedience justified? Even if there is a general obligation to obey the law, it is not absolute. Most theories recognize that the obligation can be overridden by stronger moral considerations. Civil disobedience against grave injustice is a classic example.

When is the obligation strongest? The obligation is strongest when the state is reasonably just, when the laws are democratically enacted, and when the benefits of compliance are widely shared. It is weakest when the state is unjust, when the laws are oppressive, or when compliance would require complicity in serious wrongdoing.

How should we weigh competing considerations? Political obligation is one factor in moral deliberation, not the only one. When the obligation to obey conflicts with other moral duties — to protect the innocent, to resist injustice, to follow conscience — we must weigh the competing considerations and make a judgment.

Key Principles

The Principle of Legitimacy: Political authority must be justified. The burden of proof is on those who claim the right to rule. An illegitimate state does not generate genuine political obligations.

The Principle of Reciprocity: Those who benefit from the cooperative scheme of a just society have an obligation to contribute their fair share. This is the intuition behind the fairness theory.

The Principle of Justice: The obligation to obey the law is contingent on the justice of the legal system. We have stronger obligations to just institutions than to unjust ones.

The Principle of Conscience: The claims of conscience may override the claims of the state. When the law requires us to do what we believe is seriously wrong, we may be justified in disobeying.

Practical Applications

As a Citizen: Understanding political obligation helps you think about your relationship to the state. You are not merely a subject of the law but a participant in a system of mutual obligation. This understanding should inform your political participation, your willingness to comply with the law, and your decisions about when to resist.

As a Lawbreaker: The distinction between ordinary lawbreaking and civil disobedience is important. If you choose to violate the law, you should understand the moral stakes. Are you violating a just law for self-interested reasons? Or are you disobeying an unjust law as a matter of conscience? The moral evaluation differs significantly.

As a Voter: Your vote is a form of participation in the system of collective self-governance. Voting is both a right and a responsibility. In voting, you help shape the laws that you and others will be obligated to obey.

Common Challenges

The Challenge of Consent: Most people have never consented to the state's authority. The response is that some theories (natural duty, fairness, association) do not require consent. The question is whether these alternative theories succeed.

The Challenge of Unjust States: Does anyone have an obligation to obey an unjust state? Most theories say no — or at least, the obligation is much weaker. The implication is that citizens of unjust states may be justified in resisting.

The Challenge of Partial Compliance: Even in a generally just state, some laws are unjust. What is our obligation to unjust laws? The answer depends on the degree of injustice and the availability of legal remedies. For minor injustices, we may have an obligation to obey while working for reform. For grave injustices, civil disobedience may be justified.

The Challenge of Global Obligation: Do we have political obligations to states other than our own? Do we have obligations to global institutions? These questions are increasingly important in an interconnected world. Cosmopolitan theorists argue that our obligations extend beyond national borders; critics argue that political obligation is necessarily tied to the particular political community of which we are members.