Quotation archive
“Reporting an outcome's occurrence increased its perceived probability of occurrence”
Baruch Fischhoff · Hindsight ≠ Foresight
Quote record
Author
Baruch Fischhoff
Source
Hindsight ≠ Foresight
Chapter / location
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 1(3), 1975, abstract and page 288
Tradition
cognitive-biases · decision-making · quote
Source information
From Hindsight ≠ Foresight, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 1(3), 1975, abstract and page 288.
Translation
English translation; consult the named source edition for the original wording.
Context
Read the contextual commentary in this archive entry.
Interpretation
Learn fischhoff on hindsight through its definition, strongest evidence, a worked example, key limitations, and practical decision implications.
Knowledge network
Related Archive Records
Quote
“Reporting an outcome's occurrence increased its perceived probability of occurrence”
Author
For Fischhoff on Hindsight, baruch Fischhoff wrote this formulation in the named scholarly work. On the Fischhoff on Hindsight record, authorship follows the publication record instead of later quote collections.
Source
In this Fischhoff on Hindsight context, the source is Hindsight ≠ Foresight, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 1(3), 1975, abstract and page 288. Applied specifically to Fischhoff on Hindsight, the excerpt is deliberately short and its capitalization follows the located text.
Context
For Fischhoff on Hindsight, “Reporting an outcome's occurrence increased its perceived probability of occurrence” — Fischhoff, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 1(3), 1975, abstract and p. On the Fischhoff on Hindsight record, 288. In this Fischhoff on Hindsight context, in context, the wording identifies a precise research claim, not a slogan that all intuitive judgment is defective. Applied specifically to Fischhoff on Hindsight, the surrounding argument states the elicitation task, comparison, and evidentiary limit.
Meaning
For Fischhoff on Hindsight, the passage matters because it compresses “Reporting an outcome's occurrence increased its perceived probability of occurrence” — Fischhoff, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 1(3), 1975, abstract and p. On the Fischhoff on Hindsight record, 288. In this Fischhoff on Hindsight context, its responsible interpretation keeps the experimental or theoretical boundary visible and does not diagnose an individual from an isolated choice.
Related Wisdom
Applied specifically to Fischhoff on Hindsight, the quotation connects to calibrated confidence, base-rate reasoning, disconfirming evidence, and decision-process review. For Fischhoff on Hindsight, those links explain the idea instead of merely collecting adjacent names.
Sources
- Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases — Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman; Science 185(4157), 1124–1131 (1974); source 1 supports the Fischhoff on Hindsight evidence audit.
- Crossref Scholarly Metadata — Crossref; Authoritative source record; source 2 supports the Fischhoff on Hindsight evidence audit.
On the Fischhoff on Hindsight record,
Evidence Audit
The cited findings audit for Fischhoff on Hindsight begins with a narrow claim: “reporting an outcome's occurrence increased its perceived probability of occurrence” — fischhoff, journal of experimental psychology: human perception and performance 1(3), 1975, abstract and p. In this Fischhoff on Hindsight context, 288. Applied specifically to Fischhoff on Hindsight, the first cited record, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, is used for that owned proposition. For Fischhoff on Hindsight, the second source supplies a comparison or field-level boundary. On the Fischhoff on Hindsight record, neither source is treated as authority for facts it does not report.
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- topic
Judgment Under Uncertainty
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Archive references
Sources
- 01Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and BiasesBy Amos Tversky and Daniel KahnemanScience 185(4157), 1124–1131 (1974); source 1 supports the Fischhoff on Hindsight evidence auditConsult source
- 02Crossref Scholarly MetadataBy CrossrefAuthoritative source record; source 2 supports the Fischhoff on Hindsight evidence auditConsult source
Source and quality checks completed
Quality check completed 2026-08-28