What Is Reformed Epistemology?

What Is the Question?

Reformed epistemology is a position in the philosophy of religion that holds theistic belief can be rational without being inferred from other beliefs. It takes its name from the Reformed, or Calvinist, theological tradition, in which the notion of a sensus divinitatis, a sense of the divine, has long been a feature of theological anthropology. The view was developed in its contemporary form by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff in a series of papers and books from the 1980s, most notably the collection Faith and Rationality (1983) and Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief (2000).

The question the tradition addresses is whether theistic belief is rational only if it is supported by inferential evidence. The evidentialist tradition, dominant in analytic philosophy of religion through the mid-twentieth century, said yes. Reformed epistemology says no, not necessarily. Theistic belief can be "properly basic," rational without being inferred from other beliefs, if it is produced by a reliable belief-forming mechanism. The question is what the proper basicality of theistic belief amounts to, and whether the view can be defended.

The SEP entry on religious epistemology treats Reformed epistemology as one of the three main positions in the contemporary debate, alongside evidentialism and fideism. The three views turn on different theories of what rationality requires, and the disagreement reaches into the foundations of epistemology.

Historical Background

The notion of a sensus divinitatis is older than the Reformed tradition. Augustine held that the human soul has an implicit knowledge of God, which sin obscures but does not erase. Aquinas treated the knowledge of God as natural, in the sense that reason can reach it without revelation, though the knowledge is inferential, drawn from the manifest design of the world. John Calvin, in the Institutes, gave the sensus divinitatis its classic statement: God has planted in human beings a sense of the divine, which produces belief in God in appropriate circumstances, such as when we contemplate the stars, or feel guilt, or experience beauty. The belief, on Calvin's view, is not inferred from other beliefs but is produced directly by the sense.

Plantinga took the Calvinian notion and developed it in an analytic philosophical framework. The central claim is that theistic belief can be "properly basic," a term drawn from the foundationalist epistemology of the mid-twentieth century. In classical foundationalism, the foundations of knowledge are the beliefs that are self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible, and all other beliefs must be inferred from these. Plantinga argued that classical foundationalism is too restrictive: it excludes many beliefs we treat as rational, including beliefs about other minds, beliefs about the external world, and beliefs about the past. If those beliefs can be properly basic, why not theistic belief?

The Argument for Proper Basicality

Plantinga's argument has three steps. The first is the critique of classical foundationalism. The classical criteria, Plantinga argued, are self-referentially incoherent: the claim "only self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible beliefs are properly basic" is not itself self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible. The criteria, if true, would undermine themselves. The second step is the positive proposal that proper basicality is determined by the reliability of the belief-forming mechanism, not by the inferential structure. Beliefs about other minds, beliefs about the past, perceptual beliefs, and memory beliefs are properly basic because they are produced by reliable mechanisms. The third step is the application: if theistic belief is produced by a reliable mechanism, the sensus divinitatis, then it is properly basic in the same way.

The question whether theistic belief is properly basic is the question whether the sensus divinitatis is reliable, and that is the question whether theism is true. Plantinga's argument does not settle the question of God's existence; it relocates it. The Reformed epistemologist does not claim to have proved theism, only to have shown that theistic belief can be rational without inferential evidence, if theism is true. The view is a conditional defense: if theism is true, then theistic belief has warrant, the property that turns true belief into knowledge. See the companion entry on the rationality of faith for the wider context.

The A/C Model

Plantinga developed the view, in Warranted Christian Belief, into the A/C model, named for the Aquinas/Calvin tradition. On the A/C model, the Holy Spirit produces belief in God in the believer, in response to the manifest design of the world, the experience of guilt, the contemplation of beauty, or the reading of scripture. The belief is not inferred from these circumstances but is produced in the believer by the Spirit, through the sensus divinitatis. The model, Plantinga argues, gives theistic belief warrant, if theism is true, because the mechanism is reliable, and a reliable mechanism is what warrant requires.

The A/C model is the most ambitious version of Reformed epistemology, because it includes the work of the Holy Spirit, a specifically theological claim. Plantinga is careful to note that the model is a proposal, not a proof, and that its defensibility depends on whether theism is true. The model is a "model" of how theistic belief can have warrant, not a demonstration that it does. The question whether theism is true, and whether the model is correct, is a separate question, and Plantinga does not claim to have settled it.

Objections to Reformed Epistemology

The most famous objection is the "great pumpkin" objection, which Plantinga himself raised in a self-critical moment. If the sensus divinitatis can make theistic belief properly basic, why cannot a "great pumpkin" sensus make belief in the great pumpkin properly basic? The objection generalizes: any belief can be defended by positing a mechanism that produces it, and if such a mechanism is sufficient for proper basicality, then any belief can be properly basic, which seems absurd.

Plantinga's reply, developed over many years, is that proper basicality must be tested reflectively. We ask whether the alleged mechanism is reliable, whether the beliefs it produces cohere with our other knowledge, whether the resulting epistemology is plausible. The test is not decisive, but it is not vacuous either. The theist can argue that the sensus divinitatis is reliable because theism is true, and that the resulting epistemology is plausible because it fits with the manifest design of the world, the existence of moral and aesthetic experience, and the persistence of religious belief across cultures. The great pumpkin fails the test, on the theist's view, because there is no reason to think there is a great pumpkin sensus, and the resulting epistemology is not plausible.

A second objection is the problem of religious diversity. If the sensus divinitatis produces belief in God, why does it produce incompatible beliefs across cultures? The Hindu and the Muslim, the Buddhist and the Catholic, all claim religious experience, and their beliefs differ. The Reformed epistemologist can reply that the sensus divinitatis produces a thin belief in God, and that the thicker theological commitments are shaped by culture and tradition, but the reply concedes that the sensus is less specific than the model initially suggests. The debate is live, and the question of religious experience is central to it.

A third objection is the problem of defeat. If the theist has a properly basic belief in God, but also has evidence against theism, such as the problem of evil, does the negative evidence defeat the basic belief? Plantinga's reply is that defeat depends on the strength of the negative evidence, and that the problem of evil, while serious, does not obviously defeat theistic belief, since the free will defense and the greater-goods theodicy provide possible defenses. The question of defeat is the question of how the properly basic belief interacts with the rest of the believer's epistemic situation, and it is a live research program in Reformed epistemology.

Reformed Epistemology and Evidentialism

Reformed epistemology is sometimes presented as the opposite of evidentialism, but the opposition is more subtle. The Reformed epistemologist does not deny that evidence can be relevant to theistic belief, only that inferential evidence is necessary for the belief to be rational. The Reformed epistemologist can accept natural theology as a confirmation of the properly basic belief, and can engage with the problem of evil as a potential defeater. The disagreement with evidentialism is about the baseline, about whether theistic belief is rational in the absence of inferential evidence. The Reformed epistemologist says yes, the evidentialist says no, and the rest of the philosophical work, engaging with arguments and objections, is shared.

Contemporary Relevance

Reformed epistemology has reshaped the contemporary debate. Before Plantinga, the analytic debate was largely evidentialist, and the question was whether the theistic arguments were strong enough to discharge the evidentialist burden. After Plantinga, the debate includes the prior question of whether the evidentialist demand is well-founded, and the theist has a position that does not concede the demand. The result is a more pluralistic debate, in which evidentialism, Reformed epistemology, and fideism all have adherents.

The deeper lesson is that the question of theistic belief's rationality cannot be settled in the abstract, because it depends on substantive claims about what rationality is, what kind of belief theistic belief is, and what kind of being God is. Reformed epistemology is one answer to those questions, and the philosophical work is to compare it with the alternatives, not to dismiss it by procedural fiat. The view is not a settled doctrine, but it is a serious position that has earned its place in the debate.

Sources

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Religious Epistemology" — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religious-epistemology/
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Alvin Plantinga" — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plantinga/
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Thomas Aquinas" — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas/
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "John Calvin" — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/calvin/

Related Topics

• Is Faith Rational? — the question Reformed epistemology addresses.
• What Is Religious Experience? — the experiential input.
• What Is Natural Theology? — the evidentialist alternative.
• Who Bears the Burden of Proof for God? — the procedural question.
• Does God Exist? — the central question.
• Philosophy of Faith — the wider domain.