What Is a Theodicy?

What Is a Theodicy?

A theodicy is an attempt to justify God—specifically, to justify the claim that God is both perfectly good and all-powerful, in the face of the existence of evil. The word was coined by the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, who used it (in the Theodicée of 1710) to mean "vindicating God" (theos + dike, God plus justice). The project of theodicy is older than the word—Augustine, Aquinas, and medieval thinkers all worked on it—but Leibniz gave it the name and the modern framework. The theodicist tries to show that God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil, and that those reasons are consistent with God's perfect goodness and power.

A theodicy differs from a defense, and the distinction matters. A defense, in the modern sense (developed by Alvin Plantinga), only tries to show that God and evil are logically consistent—that there's no formal contradiction in the claims "God exists" and "evil exists." A defense doesn't need to identify God's actual reasons; it only needs to show that such reasons are possible. A theodicy is more ambitious: it tries to identify the actual reasons, or at least the kinds of reasons, that God has for permitting evil. Theodicies are harder to construct than defenses, because they commit to a specific account of why God permits evil, and that account can be tested against the actual evils we observe.

The Leibnizian Origin

Leibniz's theodicy rests on a distinctive metaphysical claim: that God, being supremely good and powerful, must have created the best of all possible worlds. God's goodness requires choosing the best, and God's power ensures that what God chooses is achieved. So the world we have, with all its evil, must be the best possible—any apparent evil is necessary for a greater good, and removing the evil would make the world worse overall. Voltaire satirized this view in Candide (1759), where the optimistic Dr. Pangloss insists, against the Lisbon earthquake and every other disaster, that "all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds."

Leibniz's view has been criticized both inside and outside theism. Critics argue that it makes God the author of evil, that it seems to deny the reality of evil (since evil is "really" good in disguise), and that it conflicts with the free will of creatures (if God must create the best, creatures' choices seem determined). The SEP entry on Leibniz treats the theodicy as serious but contested, and most contemporary theodicists have moved away from the strong "best of all possible worlds" thesis to more modest accounts.

The Augustinian Type

The Augustinian theodicy, developed by Augustine and elaborated by Aquinas and the medieval tradition, traces evil to the free will of creatures. Evil is not a positive thing but a privation—a lack of good that should be there, as darkness is the absence of light. God created everything good, but God also created creatures with free will, and free will can turn away from the good. Moral evil results when creatures misuse their freedom; natural evil results either from the same misuse (on some versions, the Fall corrupted nature itself) or from the conditions of a stable natural order. God permits evil because God values free creatures, and because God can bring greater goods out of evil.

The Augustinian theodicy has been the dominant theodicy in Western Christianity, and it handles moral evil well. Its main difficulty is natural evil, especially animal suffering before humans existed, which the "Fall corrupted nature" move can't easily address. Critics also argue that the privation theory of evil doesn't really explain why God permits the privation, and that the free will move doesn't justify the scale of suffering. The Augustinian theodicy remains influential, but it's usually combined with other moves to handle its gaps.

The Irenaean or Soul-Making Type

The Irenaean theodicy, named for the early church father Irenaeus and developed in the twentieth century by John Hick, takes a different approach. Instead of treating evil as the result of a Fall, it treats the world as a place for soul-making—the development of moral and spiritual character. A world without challenge, suffering, or difficulty would produce no courage, no compassion, no moral growth. Evil, on this view, is the necessary condition for the formation of virtuous souls. The world isn't a paradise that got spoiled; it's a school, designed for the gradual formation of beings who can freely come to love God and the good.

The Irenaean theodicy handles natural evil better than the Augustinian, because it treats natural evil as part of the design, not as a corruption. But it has its own difficulties. Critics argue that it treats humans as means to God's ends (souls are "made" through suffering), that it doesn't justify the scale of suffering (would a loving schoolmaster use so much pain?), and that it conflicts with the hope of a world without suffering. The SEP entry treats it as a serious alternative to the Augustinian type, with its own costs.

Other Theodicies and Defenses

Several other approaches deserve mention. Process theodicy, developed by process theologians like David Griffin, holds that God doesn't have coercive power over creatures but only persuasive power; evil results from creatures' resistance to God's persuasion, and God suffers with us rather than imposing the suffering. The free will defense, developed by Plantinga, is technically a defense rather than a a theodicy—it shows that God and evil are logically consistent, without committing to God's actual reasons. Skeptical theism, mentioned earlier, argues that we're not in a position to identify God's reasons at all, which is in some tension with the project of theodicy.

These approaches differ in what they take God's goodness and power to be, and in how they handle the scale of suffering. Process theodicy revises omnipotence; the free will defense relies on the value of free creatures; skeptical theism defers judgment. The SEP entry treats the variety as a sign that the problem of evil has no single received solution, and that different theodicists make different trade-offs.

Theodicy and the Stakes

Theodicy matters because the problem of evil is the most serious challenge to theism. If theism can't make sense of evil, it's in trouble, however well the positive arguments for God go. Theodicies are the theist's attempt to meet the challenge head-on, by identifying the reasons God might have for permitting evil. The attempt has driven a great deal of theology and philosophy, and the difficulty of producing a fully satisfying theodicy is one reason some theists prefer the more modest defense or skeptical theism.

Theodicy also matters because it has implications beyond philosophy. How a religious community understands evil shapes how it responds to suffering—whether it sees suffering as punishment, as opportunity, as mystery, or as something to be fought. The theodicies a tradition accepts shape its pastoral practice, its politics, and its stance toward the world's pain. The SEP entry treats theodicy as a central project of philosophy of religion, with stakes that go beyond the academy.

Sources

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Problem of Evil" — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Philosophy of Religion" — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philosophy-religion/
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Augustine" — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/augustine/
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Leibniz" — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz/

Related Topics

• What Is the Problem of Evil? — the challenge theodicy replies to.
• What Is the Free Will Defense? — the main Augustinian-style reply.
• What Is the Soul-Making Theodicy? — Hick's Irenaean version.
• What Is Natural Evil? — the harder half of the problem.
• Philosophy of Evil — the wider framework.